Resources, violence and the telluric geographies of small wars by Korf, Benedikt
 1
Resources, Violence and the Telluric Geographies  




Department of Geography, University of Zurich, Winterthurerstrasse 190, CH 8057 
Zurich. E-mail: benedikt.korf@geo.uzh.ch 
 




I would like to thank Roland Bleiker, Christine Bichsel, Tilman Brück, Sarah Byrne, 
Tobias Hagmann, Stathis Kalyvas, Timothy Raeymaekers and Conrad Schetter as 
well as several anonymous referees and the editors of Progress for very useful, 
critical, while encouraging comments on several drafts of this paper. All errors remain 




Resources, Violence and the Telluric Geographies of Small Wars  
 
Abstract 
A growing literature debates the proposition that insurgency in “small wars” is 
primarily driven by opportunities to exploit or loot abundant natural resource and by 
feasibility factors. While recent studies on the geography of opportunity, feasibility 
and predation have qualified some of these broad claims, the literature is still in need 
of a better understanding of the micro-geographies of small wars. Through a critical 
discussion of this literature, I will argue for an analytics of “telluric geographies” that 




In Theorie des Partisanen Carl Schmitt writes that a partisan is connected “... with the 
soil, with the autochthonous population and the geographical characteristics of the 
country – the mountain, forest, jungle, and desert [...]. The partisan is distinguished 
from the pirate as well as from the corsair ...” (Schmitt [1963] 2006, 26-27; translation 
from original).1 Schmitt’s romantic image of the partisan as a “telluric” insurgent 
seems but a distant murmur in comparison to characterizations of the modern 
insurgent: Paul Collier describes insurgency as “quasi-criminal activity” – an 
instrumental strategy to monopolize economic rents (Collier 2000). Georg Elwert 
                                                 
1   I thank Conrad Schetter for directing me to this quote and to the “telluric” character of the partisan 
figure in Carl Schmitt’s thought, see also, Meyer et al. (2010). The term “telluric” emphasizes the 
territorialized, earth-bound mode of operation of the partisan, who is connected to the “soil” and to the 
population, in Schmitt’s view. I will come back to this image of “telluric” at the end of the paper when 
I summarize my critique of the literature reviewed in this paper. “Telluric” also reminds me of the 
Schiller’s saga of Wilhelm Tell, where Tell and his allies are bound together by their attachment to 
their territory. Of course, one should not read into the term “telluric” an apology of a Ratzelian kind of 
environmental determinism. 
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writes that insurgents turned warlords “are ... entrepreneurs who use deliberate 
violence as an efficient tool for achieving economic gains” (Elwert 1999, 87). Collier, 
Elwert - and after them many other writers - maintain, contra Schmitt, that the 
modern insurgent is not distinguishable from a pirate or a bandit. When insurgency 
occurs today, these authors suggest, it is because it is economically rational to do so. 
Is war, to re-paraphrase Clausewitz, the continuation of economics by other means?2 
Paul Collier’ proposition that the opportunity to loot or exploit resources was 
crucial for the feasibility of violent rebellion to emerge and to be sustained (his 
“greed” theory”) stimulated a large body of literature that writes about “greed”, 
“opportunity to loot”, “resource curse”, “resource wars” largely relating to “intra-
state” or “civil” wars (Collier 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 2005, Collier et al 
2004, Collier et al 2009). Most writings in this tradition or “paradigm” (Ron 2005) 
tend to concur with the view that an abundance of natural resources can provide 
opportunities for violence, but different types of explanatory models are employed to 
explicate the causal links between resource abundance and the occurrence or 
persistence of such violence, warfare and insurgency.  
Although this research field (“ethnicity, natural resources and violent civil 
conduct”) has been identified by the Times Higher Education in 2009 as one of the 
top 10 research fronts in the social sciences (Wrigley and Overman 2010, 5, Table 4), 
it has remained a rather marginal field within the study of the geographies of war and 
peace.3 John O’Loughlin (2005) reminds us that these types of war have often 
occurred in a “hegemonic shadow” and scholarly attention among geographers has 
                                                 
2 Clausewitz made the famous claim that war was the continuation of politics by other means. David 
Keen first re-phrased this into “economics by other means” (Keen 1997, 2000).  
3 For a recent review of the variety of geographical literature in this field see: Kobayashi (2009) and the 
contribution in the special issue of the Annals of the Association of American Geographers 99 (5). In 
Colin Flint’s edited volume on The geography of war and peace (2005), only few contributions engage 
explicitly with this debate, e.g. Le Billon (2005b) and, to some extent, O’Loughlin (2005). 
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mainly focused on the “hot wars” (Flint 2005, 3) that occurred after 9/11. Only more 
recently have some contributions started to attend to the geography of “resource 
violence” – to the spatialities and temporalities of resource exploitation and their 
entanglements with violent conflict. Though they have been important and influential 
(beyond geography as a discipline), these conceptualizations are often still in an early 
stage of development (e.g. Le Billon 2001, Le Billon 2008, O’Loughlin and Raleigh 
2007, Raleigh et al. forthcoming).  
This paper discusses this emergent research field that explores the geography 
of opportunity and feasibility of violent insurgency and its link to natural resource 
exploitation, looting and predation. This literature has been important to specify and 
qualify some of the rather broad claims made by Collier’s original propositions and 
the research field that emerged as a response to his studies (Ron 2005). This 
geography of opportunity, feasibility and predation literature has helped to clarify 
some of the conceptual micro-foundations of a research field that has predominantly 
relied on large-N (cross-country) statistical analysis at the cost of leaving the 
conceptual micro-foundations that specify causal mechanisms to link measurement 
and interpretation underspecified (Cramer 2002, Kalyvas 2006, 2008, Korf 2006, 
Verwimp et al. 2009). It is on these specifications of micro-foundations (Kalyvas 
2008), not on statistical correlation mechanisms that this review is focused. This paper 
is an attempt to review these explicit and implicit micro-foundations and to point to 
some blind spots pertinent in the literature.  
The “geography of opportunity, feasibility and predation” literature reviewed 
in this paper has (a) introduced terrain and location factors in shaping opportunity and 
feasibility of violent insurgency, (b) linked resource typologies with propensities of 
violent insurgency, and (c) identified transnational resource flows as spaces of 
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opportunity for multiple actor types. It has done so by utilizing spatially explicit 
methodologies, by conceptual innovations and by new empirical studies using a finer 
geographical scale. While this literature has helped refine understanding of the 
geography of opportunity, feasibility and predation, it has mainly worked through the 
conceptual lenses provided by Collier’s opportunity and feasibility concepts. This 
reliance on Collier comes at a cost. Studying the “geography of opportunity, 
feasibility and predation” focuses on belligerents’ motivations, strategies and 
opportunities and blinds the analyst to the complex “struggles over geography” (Said 
1993, Watts 2000) – or, what I will call the “telluric geographies” of such wars. These 
“telluric geographies” entail a much more complex geography of actors, strategies, 
motivations and opportunities; it entails more than rational action and strategizing, it 
entails more than simply the opportunity for combat and personal enrichment.  
After reviewing the “micro-foundations” of Collier’s opportunity and 
feasibility concepts, I will develop a typology to categorize the approaches in the 
literature on the geography of opportunity, feasibility and predation. While these 
important contributions will be acknowledged, I will argue that the micro-foundations 
of this literature have blind spots. I will therefore propose an alternative research 
agenda on the geography of rule, violence and affect, which I call “telluric 
geographies.” This agenda deepens and broadens the “micro-foundations” of the study 
of small wars, in particular by exploring the entanglements of greed and grievance. In 
sketching this agenda, I first discuss the work of two authors - Stathis Kalyvas and 
Michael Watts – who, while coming from very different traditions - have both 
provided a more nuanced analytics of the geography of violence and coercion. 
Second, I discuss two research fields that require more attention, i.e. the subaltern 
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geographies and agencies in the political economy of small wars and the affective 
dynamics of violence in warfare.  
 
Small wars 
The controversy about greed-driven wars, the “resource curse” and “resource wars” is 
closely related to the “new wars” debate, though the two are not identical. In New and 
Old Wars (1999), Mary Kaldor defined violence against non-combatants, and the 
deliberate targeting of non-combatants, as an essential component of these “new” 
wars. Along with other authors (e.g. Münkler 2002), Kaldor thereby identified crime 
as “the raison d’être of the new wars” (Gregory 2010, 167). Rebellion had become a 
private good (with the objective of personal enrichment) rather than a public good 
(with the objective of political liberation). This resonated well with Paul Collier’s 
proposition that opportunity to loot or exploit resources was the best explanatory 
variable to explain the onset of such wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  
Mbembe (2001, 78) describes this as privatization of the means of coercion. 
The validity of this criminalization proposition and the distinction between “old” 
(politically noble) versus “new” (economically driven) small wars has remained 
disputed, though (Gregory 2010, Kalyvas 2001). Some of the criticisms are that 
firstly, it is not at all clear that violence against civilians has increased compared to 
earlier warfare. Secondly, elements of crime have been present in various types of 
warfare throughout history. Thirdly, it is difficult to develop one general theory of 
“new wars” as these entail a differentiated landscape of violence and resource 
geographies, and fourthly, the criminalization proposition neglects the transnational 
dimensions of such wars. 
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The terminology of “new war” and of “civil war” is problematic. I therefore 
refer back to a terminology proposed by Carl von Clausewitz, the great theoretician of 
war. Clausewitz suggested the term “Kleine Kriege” (small wars) to describe wars that 
are not fought between sovereign states (which are subject to international rules of 
warfare), but a variety of state and non-state actors (Clausewitz 1966). In small wars, 
the boundaries between combatants and non-combatants, between war and peace, 
between fighting, looting and plundering, between politics and economics, are often 
obscured, transgressed, re-defined. Most small wars are fought in difficult terrain, e.g. 
remote mountains, jungle or mega-cities. In that sense, the term “small” can be 
misleading as these small wars often have disastrous short-term and long-term 
consequences, although they are “little” wars, as Mbembe (2001, 87) puts it. Indeed, 
the term “small” (or Mbembe’s “little”) indicates that these wars tend to remain at the 
margins of strategic geopolitical interest, they involve few belligerents and relatively 
simple weaponry, their tactics may be rudimentary. Although the usefulness of the 
term has been debated (Daase 1998, Beaumont 1995, Olson 1995), Derek Gregory 
(2010, 158) has recently suggested its merits for lack of better terminology. As the 
genealogy of the term “Kleine Kriege” reminds us: small wars have been fought 
throughout human history – they are not “new” wars.4 
 
The resource curse proposition 
                                                 
4 Of course, Max Boot’s controversial  The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of 
American Power makes the same point – that small wars have a long history (Boot 2002). But Boot’s 
genealogy of American involvement in so-called small wars has also a normative premise – that the US 
should pay the price of involvement in such wars for the greater good. Boot’s story is that of the 
entanglement of empire(s) in dirty, mundane – he calls it “savage” – types of warfare. Among military 
experts, the terminology of small wars is still being debated, largely in the tradition of the Small Wars 
Manual, published in 1940 by the United States Marine Corps (see, Small Wars Journal, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/).  
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A large and growing literature discusses the proposition that an abundance of lootable 
or exploitable natural resources creates economic incentives (Keen 1998, 2000) or 
“opportunities” (Collier 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 2004) to conduct warfare. In the 
1990s, the literature on environment and conflict had written about the link between 
scarcity and violence (Homer-Dixon 1999). In this sense, the claim that resource 
abundance rather than scarcity triggered the onset of small wars was seen as a 
provocation to the established literature (e.g.: De Soysa 2002). Collier explained the 
new rationale as follows: while grievances about political problems (e.g. resource 
scarcity and the unequal distribution of resource access) can be found in many places, 
violent insurgency is likely to occur only in situations where there is the opportunity 
to finance it. Without such “opportunity”, insurgency is not feasible. 
It is here that two literatures merge: the one on the political economy of small 
wars and the so-called resource curse hypothesis (e.g. Auty 1995, De Soysa 2002, 
Fearon 2005, Lujala et al 2005, Ross 1999, 2004, 2006, Sachs and Warner 1995, 
2001)5 or the “paradox of plenty” (Karl 1997) - a debate that has also attracted the 
attention of (economic) geographers (Bridge 2008, Le Billon 2001, 2004, 2008, Auty 
2001, 2004, Korf and Engeler 2007, Watts 2003, 2004a, 2004b). The resource curse 
argument states that resource wealth, rather than benefitting a population, can in fact 
become a vice, when it encourages rent-seeking elites to establish a monopoly or 
oligopoly on resource exploitation making these elites independent from revenue 
through taxes and political support from the masses. Resource wealth thereby creates 
incentives and opportunities for insurgency as a means to monopolize resource rents 
through violence and war. These opportunities shape the preferences and motivations 
of individual actors, largely young men. When small wars are ongoing, different 
                                                 
5 There are several variants of the resource curse proposition as well. This review focuses on those 
contributions that link the resource curse with violent conflict. 
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warlords establish their realms of resource exploitation, thereby financing their troops 
and guarding their territorial control. This is also why small wars are difficult to end 
as insurgents turned warlords have little interest in  giving up their revenue sources.  
This literature has been shaped largely by large-N, cross-country statistical 
correlations between resource wealth and the onset, duration or ending of small wars 
and the incidence of violence therein. The empirical results of this research field have 
thus far remained inconclusive.6 Collier and Hoeffler’s original proposition (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2002, 2004) about the statistical correlation between primary 
commodities, political instability and small wars has been increasingly contested by 
other quantitative researchers (Dixon 2009, Fearon 2005, Lujala et al. 2005, Ross 
2004). Dixon (2009) therefore concludes that only on few parameters, a consensus has 
emerged within this research field. 
In addition, the literature has been troubled by a number of semantic and 
conceptual conflations or unspecified micro-foundations (Brosza 2004, Cramer 2006, 
Dalby 2007, Ginty 2004, Kalyvas 2006, Korf 2006, Korf and Engeler 2007, Le Billon 
2008, Mack 2002, O’Loughlin and Raleigh 2007, Raleigh et al. forthcoming): some 
authors, for example the early Collier (Collier 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2002, 
2004), whose work is discussed later in this article, were concerned with the economic 
opportunities for insurgency, i.e. what makes small wars feasible – this work 
addressed the onset of small wars (see also de Soysa 2002, Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
Other authors were more concerned with the duration of small wars and what explains 
                                                 
6 See, for example: Basedau and Lay 2009, Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 
2004, 2005, De Soysa 2002, De Soysa and Neumayer 2007, Englebert and Ron 2004, Fearon and 
Laitin 2003, Fearon 2005, Fjelde 2009, Humphreys 2005, Lujala et al. 2005, Lujala 2009, 2010, 
Maconachie and Binns 2007, O’Loughlin and Raleigh 2007, Olsson 2006, Ross 2004, 2006, Snyder 
2006, Thies 2010, Welsch 2008. And this list cannot claim to exhaust the breadth of a quickly 
expanding field. 
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why these wars are difficult to end (e.g. the later Collier, i.e. Collier et al 2004, as well 
as, Elwert 1997, Fearon 2004, Jean and Rufin 1996, Keen 1997, 1998).  
 
Opportunity, feasibility, predation in small wars 
In this paper, I intend to discuss the underlying causal mechanisms (or: “micro-
foundations”) that the literature employs to explain the link between resource curse 
and small wars. Central to these debates has been Paul Collier’s famous distinction 
between greed and grievance as drivers of civil war onset. Originally, Collier 
suggested that rebellion was triggered by the pursuit of private goods, personal 
enrichment (“greed”) rather than political grievances (Collier 2000, Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002, 2004). In Collier’s model, violent insurgency occurs when there is 
opportunity to loot, when economic rents from exploiting natural resources can be 
captured and monopolized by (prospective) insurgents. Potential insurgents are 
primarily motivated by “greed” rather than by changing unjust political conditions 
(“grievances”), i.e. the analytical level is that of personal motivation.  
The kind of resources that rebels seek to loot and the technologies of extraction 
they use can be manifold (Le Billon 2001, Snyder 2006), but in the most protracted 
small wars, these were often high value resources, such as diamonds or gold (Ross 
2004). At this point, Collier’s explanatory model links with the resource curse 
literature (de Soysa 2002, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004) as the availability of 
“lootable” or exploitable resources (primary commodities) increases the vulnerability 
of a society to the incidence of small wars. If there are no exploitable or “lootable” 
resources, then rebels and combatants are not able to use them – and are thus unable 
to finance their warfare.  
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More recently, Collier et al (2009, 3) have reformulated their model as 
“feasibility hypothesis” that proposes “where rebellion is materially feasible, it will 
occur”. Already earlier, Fearon and Laitin (2003, 75f.) looked at factors that make 
insurgency more feasible and attractive. They agreed with Collier that financing is one 
determinant of viability or feasibility of rebellion, but for them, finance and 
opportunity to loot are not the only factors explaining feasibility of rebellion. They 
suggest that where incumbent rulers are weak, this encourages a rise of would-be-
rulers who arrogate the power to “tax”. In their later work, Collier et al. (2009) 
distinguish between feasibility, both financial and military, and motivation (“greed”). 
They write: “The feasibility hypothesis proposes that where rebellion is feasible it will 
occur” (Collier et al. 2009, 24). This explanation is compatible with different types of 
motivation; “greed” being only one of them. 
Material (or financial) feasibility in Collier’s sense may come from various 
sources, not only the looting of natural resources, but from taxing local populations or 
from non-local resource flows (e.g. Diaspora funding, Schlichte 2007). In Collier’s 
opportunity model, resource flows stem from the exploitation of natural resources, 
which decreases the dependence of combatants on taxing local populations. Models of 
predation, in turn, examine the extraction and taxation basis of insurgency, i.e. how 
insurgents extract rents from the livelihoods of local people and how this relationship 
is based around a deal balancing rent extraction versus protection. Snyder’s 
framework (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005, Snyder 2006) points to three components of 
extraction: the resource profile (lootable or non-lootable), the mode of extraction and 
the patterns of state spending, i.e. the trade-off of different forms of investment. 
Snyder alludes to the complex structures of extraction, predation and social (dis-) 
order. 
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Some predation models have employed Mancur Olson’s differentiation of 
roving and stationary bandits, which provides a simple model of the spatiality of rule 
(Addison et al. 2003, Azam 2002, Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Bates et al. 2002, 
Mehlum et al 2002, Skaperdas 2002, 2007). According to Olson, a stationary bandit 
has an interest to limit predation (and anarchic violence), because the social and 
economic losses resulting from predation will harm him/her economically by 
undermining the taxation basis: “If the leader of a roving bandit gang who finds slim 
pickings is strong enough to hold off a given territory and to keep other bandits out, 
[s/]he can monopolize crime in that area – [s/]he becomes a stationary bandit ... [and] 
a benefactor to those [s/]he robs” (Olson 2000, 7, 9).7 Azam (2002) and Azam and 
Hoeffler (2002) study a warlord’s trade-off between looting and fighting during 
ongoing warfare (Azam 2002, Azam and Hoeffler 2002), Mehlum et al. (2002) 
developed cost-benefit models of plunder and protection – roving warlords plundering 
versus stationary bandits providing “protection” for the people they loot, while others 
modelled warlord markets where stationary bandits extract rents from the civilians on 
their territory and provide protection against roving or neighbouring stationary 
bandits.  
While opportunity models and predation models are based in rational choice 
theory, they try to explain different social dynamics. The opportunity model originally 
explained the motivation to become a warlord, while the bandit model analyzes the 
incentives of bandits in ongoing warfare (although the opportunity model has now 
been applied to explain the duration of small wars as well). Bandit models aggregate 
individual actors into a category (the bandit) that entails a collective of individuals 
                                                 
7 Of course, Olson’s bandit model, which is quite abstract, should be read side-by-side with the 
empirically much richer work on warlord politics of William Reno (1999) or the work of Christopher 
Clapham, Morten Bøås and Kevin Dunn on African guerrillas (Clapham 1998, Bøås and Dunn 2007), 
which both would bring more nuance to patronage dynamics as well as political dynamics of so-called 
warlordism (see also, Richards 1996, Keen 2005 on Sierra Leone). 
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(the rebel group),8 whereas Collier makes motivations, the collective action dilemma 
(or opportunity costs) of individuals central to his analysis (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Opportunity, feasibility, predation 
 Opportunity model 
(greed) 
Feasibility model Predation model  
Core explanatory 
concept 
Opportunity to loot Feasibility of rebellion Extraction and 
predation 
Rationale Motivation  
(opportunity costs of 
rebellion) 




Stationary vs roving 
bandit 
Phase in small war Onset, outbreak; later also 
applied to duration and 
ending 
Onset, outbreak (Onset), ongoing  
Link to resource 
curse paradigm 
Direct: statistical 
correlation of resource 
wealth and onset of small 
wars as empirical 
confirmation of the model 
Financial feasibility: 
opportunity to loot, to 
exploit commodities; 
Indirect: incentives to 
nurture resources for 
appropriation 
(including the taxation 
of civilians) 
Key authors Collier 2000, Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002, 2004. 
Collier et al 2009; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003 
Extraction framework: 
Snyder 2006. 
Original bandit model: 
Olson 2000. 
Warlord models: 
Azam 2002, Azam and 
Hoeffler 2002, Bates et 
al 2002, Mehlum et al 
2002, Skaperdas 2002, 
2007. 
 
The broadening of Collier’s original “greed” model of motivation into models of 
opportunity, feasibility and predation has opened up the discussion that used to focus 
on primary commodities as “resource curse” to multiple factors that make rebellion 
feasible, including political, military and economic ones (Basedau and Lay 2009, 
Dunning 2005, Korf 2005, Le Billon 2008, Mehlum et al. 2006, Ron 2005, Snyder 
and Bhavnani 2005, Snyder 2006). While there continues to be a link between 
financial feasibility and the resource curse, the second component of feasibility – 
military feasibility – has rather been linked with “geography”, i.e. with terrain 
                                                 
8 Bates et al (2002, 603), for example, acknowledge that they “ignore all issues relating to internal 
organisation of the actors, including collective action problems, decision-making processes and free 
riding. We simply assume two players.” 
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indicators and models of distance. Collier et al. (2009, 4), for example, write that 
“viability [which they seem to use interchangeably to feasibility; BK] is likely to be 
assisted by some combination of geography that provides safe heavens and an 
ineffective state.” It is this conceptualization of “geography” that will be discussed in 
the next section. 
 
The geography of opportunity, feasibility and predation in small wars 
Large-N, cross-country studies have been criticized for developing abstract 
explanatory frames that are not contextualized within actual landscapes of small wars, 
i.e. their micro-foundations are often underspecified. They are not developed to 
explain variation in landscapes of warfare, but rather to identify similarities. And they 
tend to treat the territories of small wars as homogeneous (O’Lear and Diehl 2007). In 
other words, these models ignore the geography of violence in small wars, which 
includes: the spatial dynamics of warfare, fighting, exploitation and coercion; the 
differentiations of “opportunities” and economic incentives across different resource 
types and actor categories; the time-space dynamics of accumulation and protection 
and their effects on small war dynamics and the trans-national dimensions of small 
wars and insurgent financing (Ballentine and Sherman 2003, Buhaug 2007, Dalby 
2007, Flint 2005, Gregory and Pred 2007, Korf and Engeler 2007, Le Billon 2007, 
O’Lear and Diehl 2007, O’Loughlin 2005, O’Loughlin and Raleigh 2007).  
A number of recent studies have attempted to capture this “geography” of 
small wars and they have done so in very different ways and with different analytical 
connections to the motivation, opportunity and feasibility models (also these links 
have not been made explicit in the literature). The meaning and framing of 
“geography” has been manifold. I have classified this research field into four 
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approaches: (1) geography as rough terrain, (2) geography as (relative) location, (3) 
geography as resource concentration, and (4) geography as resource flow (cf. Table 
2). 
These different approaches each address some of the criticisms brought 
forward against the original opportunity, feasibility and predation literature (Table 2). 
Rough terrain models account for mountainous terrain as a locational factor that 
makes rebellion feasible. (Relative) location models use spatial grid models to 
disaggregate national territories to allow for a more fine-grained analysis of this 
“geography” than rough terrain models. Resource concentration models conceptualize 
the link between type and location of resources, technologies of exploitation and 
incentives, opportunities for and feasibility of insurgency. Resource flow models look 
into the transnational resource flows of conflict commodities and their link with 
global commodity chains. All these new approaches have made important 
contributions to understand “geography” in small wars, but we will also see that none 
has been completely convincing on its own terms. 
 
Approach 1: Geography as rough terrain 
In a number of econometric, cross-country models, “geography” in small wars has 
been conceptualized as rough terrain, being remote, sparsely populated, mountainous, 
being difficult to access and covered by forests. Rough terrain allows insurgents to 
operate guerrilla warfare, but rough terrain certainly does not “cause” small wars. A 
number of authors have tested these variables against the onset or duration of small 
wars (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Collier et al 2004, DeRouen and Sobek 2004, 
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Fearon and Laitin 2003, Fearon 2004, Rustad et al 2008).9 These rough terrain models 
are congruent with Collier’s and Fearon and Laitin’s notion of feasibility of war, 
mainly its military feasibility. However, they have produced mixed results: Dixon 
(2009) finds that the variable “mountains” has yielded contradictory results across a 
section of studies employing this variable. Collier and Hoeffler (2004), for example, 
do not find a correlation between rough terrain and the incidence of small wars, 
whereas Fearon and Laitin (2003, 85) suggest that “mountainous terrain is 
significantly related to higher rates of civil war.” In their later study, Collier at al. 
(2009, 16) largely concur with Fearon and Laitin (2003), but the statistical 
significance is not strong. De Rouen and Sobek (2004) claim that higher forest cover 
increases the likelihood of prolonged conflict.  
The key weakness of rough terrain analyses is that they correlate aggregate 
data on the state-level, whereas terrain factors are often confined to small parts of a 
country. The proxies are generated “at the wrong level of measurement: the nation 
state” (Buhaug and Lujala 2005, 404). Raleigh et al. (forthcoming, 3) conclude that: 
“many studies incorporating sub-national indicators have substituted simplified 
‘geometries’ for complicated geographies, relying on abstract and vague notions of 
distance ... or crude terrain indices.” At the same time, the rough terrain indicators 
have provided evidence for the (military) feasibility proposition rather than the 
financial opportunity or feasibility proposition, i.e. they do not say anything on 
motivations for rebellion. 
 
                                                 
9 Braithwaite (2006) discusses the “geographic spread” of militarized disputes and finds terrain 
indicators to be significant, but he is concerned with inter-state dispute, not with small wars. That is 
why his work is not discussed here. 
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Approach 2: Geography as (relative) location 
In response to these criticisms, the geography as (relative) location adopts a spatially 
disaggregated approach to (1) terrain and resource characteristics and (2) conflict 
events. This literature has either focused on absolute location within a spatial grid, or 
as relative location (“distance”), relative to a country’s capital or centres of economic 
or political powers.  
Together with different co-authors, Buhaug refined the spatial analysis of war 
dynamics within the spatial container of a war, i.e. looking at spatial scales below the 
state-level (Buhaug and Lujala 2005, Buhaug and Rød 2006). Buhaug and Lujala 
(2005) run a comparison of “geography” factors on state-level and on “conflict level” 
and conclude that “the amount of mountainous terrain in the country is positively 
associated with the duration of conflict, whereas densely forested countries tend to 
have shorter conflicts, ceteris paribus” (p. 412, italics in original). In another study, 
one confined to African civil wars, Buhaug and Rød (2006) differentiate between a) 
territorial conflict that is more likely in sparsely populated regions near the state 
border, at a distance from the capital, and without significant rough terrain and b) 
conflict over state governance that is more likely to occur in densely populated 
regions near diamond fields and close to the capital. Location factors are also 
prominent for Lujala (2010), who concludes that rebel access to gemstones and 
hydrocarbons increases conflict duration, in fact “the mere presence” (Lujala 2010, 
26) of hydrocarbon reserves increases this relationship, which he interprets in line 
with Collier’s opportunity model. 
Gates (2002) shows how distance and geographical spread of rebel forces with 
regard to a government’s stronghold affects rebel recruitment and allegiance. Buhaug 
and Gates (2002, 418) use spatial econometrics to analyse how “geographical factors 
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affect the location, relative to the capital, and scope (measured conflict area) of armed 
conflict.” Their dependent variables are the scope and location of small wars, not the 
outbreak, incidence, duration or ending of war. They define the location of fighting 
within a country as the distance between the capital city – assumed to be the centre of 
power – and the conflict centre point. Scope is conceptualized as “the geographic 
domain of the conflict zone, measured as the circular area centred around the conflict 
centre and covering all significant battle zones” (Buhaug and Gates 2002, p. 421). 
They find that the scope of conflict is associated with a number of “geographical 
factors” (p. 430), such as the total land area of the country, whether or not the conflict 
zone is adjacent to the border of a neighbouring country and whether or not natural 
resources are located in the conflict zone. With regard to location as conflict-capital 
distance, Buhaug and Gates (2002) conclude that the type of rebellion and of the rebel 
group influence where the conflict will be located and suggest that secessionist and 
identity-based wars tend to be located further away from the capital than other types 
of conflict. Buhaug and Lujala (2005, 412) add that small wars that occur at a distance 
from the capital are more likely to turn into protracted contests.  
But this spatial information used in these studies still tends to be too coarse to 
allow the study of localized accounts of violence (O’Loughlin and Witmer 2010). The 
trend towards spatial disaggregation has been further facilitated by the availability of 
new data for quantitative analysis (Cederman and Gleditsch 2009), such as the 
ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset) – that disaggregates internal 
conflicts into individual events (Raleigh et al 2009), the Correlates of War project and 
the Uppsala Riot dataset (the latter being the database for Buhaug’s studies above).10 
                                                 
10 See http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ and http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/index.htm  
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The ACLED database, for example, allows quantitative researchers to track geo-
coded data on violent events and to link details of resource use to each such events.  
Raleigh and Hegre (2009), using ACLED, applied a “grid square” approach to 
study the relationship between country size, population numbers (and spatial 
concentrations) and conclude that conflict events tend to have “frequencies in 
proportion to the size of the population in a given location [...] where populations 
cluster locally” (p. 237). They also claim that the grid square approach using ACLED 
data is suitable also to test hypotheses regarding the availability of ‘lootable’ 
resources. Hegre et al (2009) explore the link between local levels of wealth and the 
location of actual fighting in a conflict using Liberia as a case study. The authors 
conclude that violent events were more frequent in richer locations within Liberia, 
which they find supports Collier’s opportunity model, albeit results are not 
“completely contradictory to ‘grievance’ accounts [...] both aggrieved and greedy 
rebels have an incentive to target the wealthy locations where hostilities will pay off” 
(Hegre et al. 2009, 620). O’Loughlin and Witmer (2010) use event coded data to 
analyze and show the spatial diffusion of violent events in Chechnya. They identify 
“hot spot” locations of violence, and show that forested areas have more, while areas 
with high Russian population ratios have less violent events. However, they also write 
that the lack of data for predictive variables (especially on material wealth) did not 
allow them to run an effective test of the opportunity model or alternative 
explanations (the greed vs. grievance controversy) (O’Loughlin and Witmer 2010, p. 
48). O’Loughlin et al. (2010) do a similar event coding, this time using ACLED data, 
for the Afghanistan-Pakistan wars of 2008-2009, and map the non-random and 
concentrated geography patterns of violence.  
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The geography as location approach has worked on two levels: (1) 
disaggregating the resource (the independent, explanatory variable), e.g. in those 
studies that look at the location of populations, wealth or resources, and (2) 
disaggregating violence (the dependent variable), e.g. those studies that look at 
conflict events (using the ACLED dataset). These and other studies on disaggregating 
small wars (Buhaug et al 2009, Cederman et al 2009, Hegre et al 2009, Murshed and 
Gates 2005, Weidmann 2009, Weidmann et al. 2010) often resort to Collier’s 
opportunity model as well as rebel capabilities – what Collier calls “feasibility”: 
conditions that make insurgency and warfare feasible, e.g. by providing places to hide 
or withdraw, by enabling taxation of non-belligerents and exploitation of natural 
resources (including the opening of marketing channels to sell such resources). 
Weidmann (2009), for example, studies “group geography” (p. 527), i.e. the 
concentration of a social group over a territory, and constructs a causal mechanism 
between a group’s settlement pattern in physical terrain and its capacity for fighting 
(or organizing collective action). He suggests that opportunities to organize 
collectively make violent conflict more likely. 
The geography as location approach operates within the greed-grievance 
opposition (either-or) and provides a spatialized methodology (e.g. spatial 
econometrics and GIS technologies) to test these opposing propositions. 
Disaggregating the territory of warfare into spatial grids deconstructs the spatial 
container within which cross-country econometric studies had based their datasets and 
proxy indicators, in line with John Agnew’s famous critique of the territorial trap 
(Agnew 1994). Such spatial disaggregation concurs with the empirical observation 
that small wars are often spatially confined and not uniformly spread over a nation’s 
territory. At the same time, most studies still correlate certain terrain or location 
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factors with events, but the explanatory models of rebel behaviour are then derived 
from those correlations – and linked to an explanation largely in line with the 
opportunity or feasibility model (or alternative explanatory models, such as relative 
deprivation, horizontal inequalities, etc.), although sometimes, such a link is rather 
implicit than explicit. However, by spatially disaggregating conflict spaces, these 
studies cannot run large-N tests of country or conflict cases as done in the work of 
Collier and colleagues, but are confined to small-N comparisons of conflict or country 
cases (although doing large-N regressions on spatially disaggregated events or factors 
in these cases).  
 
Approach 3: Geography as resource concentration 
The geography as resource concentration approach spatializes the resource category 
and differentiates locations and types of resources, types of governance and scales of 
resource flows. Le Billon has provided an influential categorisation of how the 
properties of a resource, its location and the required technologies of exploitation 
impact upon the dynamics of rebellion and warfare (Le Billon 2001, 2004, 2005a). 
These categories are then translated into a typology that links particular types of 
insurgency and warlordism with the geographies of “lootable” or exploitable 
resources. Two categories are central in this typology creating four different types of 
resource violence: first, the relative location of the resource (vis-à-vis the power 
centre) and second, the resource concentration. With regard to resource location, Le 
Billon writes that proximate resources are close to the centre of power and firmly 
under the grip of a government, whereas distant resources are located in remote 
territories along porous borders and more prone to be captured by rebels.  
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Le Billon’s typology (2001) combines the geography as location model with a 
differentiation between point and diffuse resources. He suggests that point resources 
located in proximity to the power centre are more likely to be associated with a coup 
d’état (or foreign intervention), whereas diffuse, distant resources are more likely to 
trigger warlordism. In fact, Le Billon’s analysis indicates that the physical properties 
of a resource and the material transformations that a resource has to undergo to 
become a high-value commodity are important determinants for its attractiveness for 
looting or exploitation (see also, Lujala 2009, Ross 2004). Also, the properties of the 
resource determine whether or not they are lootable with simple technologies or 
require more sophisticated and larger-scale technologies for their exploitation.  
A similar typology has been suggested by Richard Auty (Auty 1995, 2001, 
2004, based on Sachs and Warner 1995; see also Welsch 2008). Auty’s typology links 
resource endowment with regime types using Olson’s bandit model and its four 
categories (roving bandit, stationary bandit, oligarchy and democracy). His staple-trap 
model suggests that resource-rich countries tend to spawn predatory political states as 
the incentive for a government to provide public goods, as opposed to capturing rents, 
increases with decreasing access to natural resource rents as it makes elites more 
independent from the electorate. Auty disaggregates the risk of small wars and argues 
that the socio-economic linkages of the types of resources (diffuse, point) and the 
value per weight ratio foster specific types of rebellion or rentier states. Proximity to 
porous borders is another factor that, according to Auty, enhances the mobility of 
rents and thereby encourages rebellion at the state’s periphery. 
Both, Le Billon’s and Auty’s typologies have been useful to disaggregate and 
differentiate the link between resource availability, economic incentives and 
capabilities to loot or exploit resource rents. They also indicated that there are 
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different patterns of violent conflict. Both link a typology of resource characteristics 
and location with social outcomes, though Le Billon emphasizes that he does not 
understand these relationships to be deterministic, rather that “resources provide a 
context for political mobilization as well as the motivations, strategies, and 
capabilities of belligerents” (Le Billon 2004, 15; my emphasis). “Motivations, 
strategies and capabilities” link up with Collier’s opportunity and feasibility concept, 
but the exact temporalities of these opportunities and conditions of feasibility remain 
underexplored: do these apply to incentives to start insurgency or capabilities to run a 
war economy or both? Auty’s bandit model, in turn, points to the changing elite-
citizen relations depending on resource wealth that makes elites more independent 
from popular support.  
 
Approach 4: Geography as resource flow 
The geography as resource flow approach spatializes resource flows across scales and 
applies commodity chain analysis to trace economic opportunities of resource 
appropriation across scales. One of Auty’s propositions was that proximity to borders 
enables mobility of rents and resources. This observation encouraged analysis of the 
transnational commodity chains of “conflict commodities.” Most small wars fought 
around resources – the “resource wars” - have a significant international dimension 
since high value resources gain their value only when sold on the international (black) 
market (Bridge 2008, Cooper 2002, Le Billon 2006, 2008, Ossenbrügge 2007). These 
conceptualizations explicitly used concepts developed in economic geography 
(commodity chain, production networks) to study economic opportunities and 
incentives in small wars across spatial scales and networks. While previous work had 
largely remained trapped in a container space of state or sub-state units and focused 
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on local opportunity and feasibility characteristics and local availability of precious 
resources for looting or exploitation, the resource flow approach showed that 
opportunities, incentives and resource flows are embedded in transnational economic 
flows and global market mechanisms that allow these resources to be marketed and 
sold, and thereby to become financially attractive for looting. 
Le Billon (2006, 2008) suggested that the geography of resource wars is not 
only defined by frontlines in the production area, but also by spaces along the 
commodity chain; the spatiality of resources has mining and marketing contexts. He 
studied how the commodity chains of “blood diamonds” are located within broader 
geographies of vulnerability, risk and opportunity in the war-affected countries (Le 
Billon 2008). Le Billon distinguishes the geography of vulnerability (being vulnerable 
to violent conflict due to diamond wealth), the geography of risk (territorialization of 
regulatory regimes) and the geography of opportunity (interconnectedness between 
actors and flows of material goods across spatial scales). In this sense, Le Billon’s 
model discusses spatialized economic incentives, i.e. material feasibility. 
An interesting strand of this kind of research investigates the commodity chain 
of war resources, e.g. diamonds, and how “illegal” production enters the global 
(“legal”) economy. Le Billon’s example of blood diamonds also illustrates the West’s 
geographical imagination of danger (Dalby 2004) that is associated with resources 
from specific locations, such as diamonds from West Africa (Le Billon 2006). This 
leads to a discursive differentiation of dirty and pure diamonds. For example, Le 
Billon argued that campaigns against blood diamonds displaced alluvial diamonds, 
which are often exploited by small-scale labourers, from the world market that 
became increasingly dominated by industrial exploitation dominated by large multi-
national corporations, thereby creating “good” and “bad” diamonds. But such 
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geographical imaginations are resource dependent. Oil, for example, tends to create 
less moralizing imaginations among Western consumers (Bridge 2008, Ossenbrügge 
2007), but sometimes triggers what Watts calls resource nationalism (Watts 2003).  
The resource flows approach has been instrumental to show the global 
entanglements of “conflict commodities” with global markets and consumerism. It 
also indicates that the geography of resources needs to favour a commodification of 
primary commodities into marketable goods that are to be transported into places 
where they can be integrated into global market chains. This international dimension 
of the resource curse had so far been under-examined in opportunity and feasibility 
models who had focused primarily on local conditions and local factors of 
“geography”. At the same time, resource flow models have a close link to the 
discussion on motivation (incentives), opportunity and (material) feasibility of 
insurgency. 
 
Table 2: The “geography of opportunity, feasibility and predation” in small wars 
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Four agendas: The geography of rule, violence and affect in small wars 
The four approaches discussed above have significantly advanced the literature on 
resources, violence and small wars through emphasizing spatial disaggregation of 
events, resource types and flows (Table 2). And yet, the semantics of motivation, 
opportunity and feasibility and the discussion of “conflict commodities,” “resource 
wars” and “resource curse” foreclose important mechanisms of the “micro-
foundations” of small wars, which will be discussed in this section. 
First, the literature has often conceptualized greed versus grievance in 
oppositional terms (as either-or) - as private versus public (or political) motivations. 
This opposition has been central to Collier’s opportunity model. More recent work has 
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suggested that it is the linkages between greed and grievance across multiple scales, 
connections and networks that create complex geographies of violence, coercion and 
rule in small wars (Ballentine and Sherman 2003, Cramer 2002, 2006, Goodhand 
2003, Kalyvas 2003, 2006, Korf 2005, Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009). Stathis 
Kalyvas and Michael Watts address the interactions between greed and grievance in 
their studies of the politics in small wars. While Kalyvas remains broadly loyal to the 
rational choice paradigm, that has been Collier’s home, Watts rather draws on the 
governmentality literature. 
Second, agency, opportunity and feasibility in small wars has a variegated 
geography bringing into contact a wide range of actors in spaces of negotiation, 
coercion, subordination, avoidance, resistance and patronage. The literature reviewed 
above alludes mainly to a single actor category, that of the rebels, soldiers or 
warlords. Other types of actors, e.g. “ordinary” people, non-combatants, local 
middlemen, traders, farmers, fishing folk, women, children, politicians, bureaucrats, 
chiefs, religious leaders, and their agencies are thereby written out of the analysis. 
Furthermore, agency is often conceived as rational, strategic, tactical, but the affective 
dynamics of fighting, violence and repression is thereby neglected. Two fields of 
study are relevant here: literature that explores the subaltern geographies of small 
wars and writings that discuss rationality and madness in warfare.  
 
Kalyvas: zones of violence and control 
Stathis Kalyvas starts with a critique of the research field and its lack of “micro-
foundations” (Kalyvas 2003, 2006, 2008), the causal mechanisms that explain 
statistical correlations to address “the problems of measurement and interpretation” of 
cross-national level econometric studies (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009, 335). Many 
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studies on opportunity, feasibility and predation did not have any primary empirical 
evidence about the motivations, strategies and preferences of belligerents (Kalyvas 
2008, 405), but rather used proxies, such as conflict event data. Kalyvas instead 
propagates a conceptual disaggregation of violence and conflict. His focus is on the 
patterns of homicidal violence as distinct from the logic of conflict in general, a theme 
also taken up by other authors (e.g. Straus 2006, Verwimp 2006, Weinstein 2007). 
Kalyvas proposes that there is an interaction of political and private identities, 
motivations and actions (or, that greed and grievances are not separable). Kalyvas 
argues that “analysis of the dynamics of civil war [...] is impossible in the absence of 
close attention to local dynamics” (2003, 481). 
What makes Kalyvas’ contribution interesting is that he develops a model of 
the geography of violence and control. Central to his conceptual model are the terms 
“cleavage”, “alliance” and “center-periphery”. Alliance, writes Kalyvas, “allows for 
multiple rather than unitary actors, agency located in both center and periphery rather 
than only in either one, and a variety of preferences and identities as opposed to a 
common and overarching one” (2003, 486). Cleavages are symbolic formations that 
simplify and streamline a variety of local conflicts and master-narratives in small 
wars. Kalyvas’ prime interest is now in the geography of violence and control: who 
controls which territories and where do events of violence occur? The use of violence, 
according to Kalyvas, is mostly selective (rather than indiscriminate) and bounded by 
the nature of control of belligerent groups over a specific territory. For Kalyvas, the 
likelihood of (selective) violence is a function of control. He distinguishes a typology 
of five-zone continuum from zone 1 (total incumbent control) to zone 5 (total 
insurgent control). Kalyvas’ prediction is that the distribution of selective violence is 
likely to peak in zones 2 and 4, where either group exercises hegemonic, but not total 
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control, whereas zones of complete control by one side will be largely free of 
violence, though not repression. Kalyvas has confirmed these predictions in his 
landmark study on the Greek civil war (Kalyvas 2006) and, more recently, on the 
Vietnam war (Kalyvas 2008, Kalyvas and Kocher 2009). 
Kalyvas’ propositions basically study processes of “territorializing 
domination” (Mbembe 2001, 85). But “geography” in Kalyvas’ conceptualization is 
reduced to a center-periphery dichotomy and a container-type territoriality of “zone”. 
His five zone model reproduces a duality of incumbent versus insurgent, although in a 
number of small wars, there has been a proliferation of belligerent groups and this 
boundary distinction has rather been confused. Moreover, Tarrow (2007, 592) finds 
that Kalyvas reifies violence: “the interaction between center and periphery focuses 
on violence,” but tends to ignore the relationship between violent and nonviolent 
forms of contention in the development of alliances. Kalyvas seems to suggest (2006, 
22) that contentious politics takes place during peace and violence occurs during war. 
This proposition fails to acknowledge that many mechanisms of contention are similar 
during peace and war (Spencer 2007): the “distinction between a state of war and a 
state of peace is increasingly illusory” (Mbembe 2001, 89).  
 
Watts: governable spaces 
Michael Watts’ work on ungovernable spaces in Nigeria’s oil delta opens up some of 
the points that Kalyvas’ ontology of violence rather forecloses. At the same time, 
Watts’ study links up with the resource curse literature and its link to the opportunity, 
feasibility and predation literature.11 Watts’ genealogy of oil governmentality departs 
from Collier’s opportunity model and traces “the variety of violences engendered by 
                                                 
11 Although some may question whether Watts’ empirical case is a small war, I refrain from this 
discussion as I am interested in the analytical model that Watts uses in his analysis of resources and 
violence. 
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oil (not just civil war or rebellion)” (Watts 2004a, 53), the entanglements of oil wealth 
and the complex history of social (dis-) order in Nigeria with its spaces for violence, 
claims-making and community building. In this story, oil is as much a biophysical 
entity, a commodity, as it is a source of imagination and meaning. Watts’ analysis 
emphasizes the simultaneous production (and reworking) of different forms of pre-
existing rule and governable space(s) that evolve as a result of the insertion of oil 
revenue into the Nigerian political economy (2004a, p54) and result in civil 
vigilantism. In this sense, Watts provides a typology of the geography of violence and 
control, but one that has also space for contentious politics. 
Two aspects are significant in Watts’ analysis. Firstly, he provides a fine-
grained analysis of the transformative effects of oil on various governable spaces with 
their different rationales and internal contradictions and paradoxes. Secondly, Watts 
studies the agencies of different types of actors. For example, he explains how 
indigenous chiefs organized youth militantism in order to squeeze out more benefits 
from powerful multinational oil companies. The chiefs’ strategy went out of control 
and a kind of “Mafia” – Isongoforo – controlled much of the monies appropriated 
from the companies through the arms with which they exercised control. This civic 
vigilantism emerged from the “opportunities for appropriating … resources” (Watts 
2004a, 64).  
Watts’ analytics go beyond Collier’s opportunity model. In what he calls 
“space of indigeneity”, oil serves as an elitist endeavour for ethnic claims-making and 
rights talk (Watts 2004a, 71). Oil also kept Nigeria together as a nation – and 
fragmented it. While the (nation) state used oil revenues to build a nation, various 
communities used oil wealth to activate community claims and thereby made “the 
Nigerian National Symbolic ... simply a big lie” (Watts 2004a, 74). Oil revenues 
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provide rents, which increase competition for power, offices and politics. Within this 
competition, claims to the rightness of access and control over resources and its 
regulation become central.  
I think Watts’ most important point is that conflicts and politics (in Nigeria) 
emerge from an oil complex that is spatially heterogeneous and not easily 
encompassed by ideas of opportunity, feasibility, predation, looting, rebellion or 
incentives for violence only. Watts writes that oil becomes an idiom for “doing 
politics” (Watts 2004a, 76). This politics is embedded in an already existing landscape 
of power and politics – at this point, he concurs with Kalyvas. But Watts’ conceptual 
model of three governable spaces wherein struggles over geography are fought, 
remains surprisingly static; rather, it is not only within, but also at the interfaces of 
these different governable spaces, where struggles are fought, lives are lived and 
politics takes place – as much as predation. While Watts looks at the “simultaneous 
production of differing forms of rule and governable space ... which work against, and 
often stand in direct confrontation to each other”, his analysis leaves us unclear about 
the mechanisms of how these governable spaces merge, coincide, overlap to create the 
ragged, unstable, ungovernable spaces (Korf et al. 2010). 
 
Subaltern geographies of small wars 
The opportunity and feasibility models of insurgency constructs an analytical focus on 
one actor category, that of the (potential) insurgent and his or her motivations, 
incentives and capabilities. This reading tends to neglect a number of other types of 
actors that play a role in small wars, those of “ordinary” people. Small wars, while 
providing a break with “peace”, also produce a number of continuities in political 
alliances, social and economic networks prior to the conflict – rarely do they 
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constitute a complete rupture with the past (Lubkemann 2007). Indeed, a number of 
more recent studies have broadened the analytic lens towards the many others who are 
also part of and shape struggles over geography in small wars (Bohle 2007, Bohle and 
Fünfgeld 2007, Collison 2003, Fünfgeld 2007, Gaasbeek 2010, Goodhand et al 2000, 
Kalyvas 2006, Keen 2005, Korf 2004, 2005, Korf and Fünfgeld 2006, Kurtenbach und 
Lock 2004, Lubkemann 2007, Macamo 2006, Nordstrom 2004, Richards 2005, Utas 
2005, Vigh 2006). Many of these studies suggest that non-belligerents navigate 
through the difficult terrain of markets or oligopolies of violence, develop their own 
“weapons of the weak” – to borrow a famous term from James Scott (1985) - and 
make use of opportunities for economic gains where they find these; or display 
strategies to keep belligerents at arm’s length in order to survive, to safeguard 
precarious livelihoods or to actively engage in clientele networks.  
These subaltern geographies of small wars indicate the shadows of war 
(Nordstrom 2004), the ambivalences of the political economy of war, where survival 
and war economies are closely intertwined (Bohle 2007, Collison 2003, Fünfgeld 
2007, Korf 2004, Lunstrum 2009, Macamo 2006, Korf 2005, Korf et al 2010, 
Lubkemann 2007, Nordstrom 2004, Richards 2005, Schlichte 2009), where “greed”, 
“opportunity”, as well as “grievances” and “vulnerability” are not confined to either 
“belligerents” or “civilians.” While Kalyvas’ analytics has focused on violence, the 
subaltern geographies of small wars point to the intricate links of violence with 
contentious politics, coercion, consent, avoidance, resistance and vulnerability that 
has been shown in Watts’ analysis, although he is less interested in subaltern 
agencies.  
Studies on subaltern geographies have been strong in underlining the 
variegated geographies of feasibility and opportunity and the complex web of 
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relations, economic flows, inter-dependencies across scales and connections that 
political economies of war and violence nurture. And yet, the subaltern geographies 
literature may have been overdoing its case by its tendency to promote an image of 
flow and navigation (e.g. Vigh 2006, Utas 2005), which celebrates agencies and 
perhaps downplays the structural constraints within which people’s agencies flow.12  
 
Rationality and madness 
Violence has an incalculable dimension, can go out of hand – the “madness” that is 
not rational. When David Keen wrote about “a rational kind of madness” (Keen 
1997), he suggested that what appeared to be mad (atrocities, mindless violence, etc.) 
was rational for war entrepreneurs to achieve their ends. Keen’s suggestive terms 
complies with a wide array of literature, including Collier’s greed model or Elwert’s 
notion of “markets of violence” (Elwert 1997) and the opportunity, feasibility and 
predation paradigm. Violence is used to achieve something (monopolize rents, for 
example). These contributions propagate a rationalist conception of violence, which 
downplays the dynamics of affect and emotions in violent struggle, in organizing 
insurgency, in defining friend and foe, in demarcating territories, in identity struggles 
over belonging, but also in generating vulnerabilities (Cramer 2002, Korf 2006).  
Legitimizations and rationalizations of war and violence may play with the 
mobilization of fear, rage, anger, and hope in relation to threat and opportunity (Keen 
2005; Schlichte 2009, Spencer 2007, Weinstein 2007). Collier writes that belligerents 
may deploy grievance discourses to bind fighters (Collier 2000). Stathis Kalyvas 
suggests that logics of violence are often driven more by local grievances that utilize 
the master grievance to settle old scores (Kalyvas 2006; also: Korf 2005, Korf and 
                                                 
12   For a more detailed critique of this problematic emphasis on agencies and navigation, see Korf et al. 
(2010). 
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Fünfgeld 2006, Lubkemann 2007, Richards 1996). This complies with David Keen’s 
work on Sierra Leone where “part of the impetus for atrocities in Sierra Leone’s civil 
war was resentment at neglect and abuse (and a concomitant desire for respect ...) [... 
and] a perception within various fighting groups that civilians had somehow ‘turned 
against’ or ‘betrayed’ them” (Keen 2008, 56, Keen 2005). Georg Elwert suggests that 
the generation of fear – the fear of becoming a victim and the resulting feeling of 
revenge - is “a particularly cost-effective form of mobilising troops” (Elwert 1999, 
90). Revenge creates retaliation and an escalation of violence that war entrepreneurs 
can use for their economic gains.  
However, this reading of economic rationalities in steering violence overlooks 
the affective dynamics that war nurtures. Certainly, belligerents utilize “grievances”, 
steer emotions and foster longing for respect, they play with fear and revenge for their 
“rational” purposes. But violence can get out of control and develop a dynamic 
beyond calculation and rationality. Ernst Jünger once famously described the 
addictive force that can emerge in the midst of fighting, violence and destruction, a 
reading recently rediscovered in his diaries from World War I (Jünger 2010). Chris 
Hedges has been influential in writing about how violence in warfare can become 
addictive or exhilarating for belligerents or other perpetrators of violence, how it 
shapes a culture of war, how war becomes a drug (Hedges 2002). Wolfgang Sofsky 
suggests that those who kill escape the compulsion to control themselves (Sofsky 
2003). Feldman’s work on the prosthetics and aesthetics of terror and violence, the 
ecology of fear and anxiety in the Irish civil war is also suggestive (Feldman 1997). It 
is this phenomenology of the incalculable, perhaps subconscious, irrational in the 
geography of violence that requires more careful and systematic work. Indeed, John 
Agnew comes to the conclusion that the literature on the phenomenology of affect and 
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violence in small wars (and other wars) is still sketchy (Agnew 2009) and I concur 
with his reading that this is a research agenda requiring more careful development.13  
 
The telluric geographies of small wars 
Stathis Kalyvas has reframed the two competing interpretative concepts of greed 
versus grievance that have been so influential in the literature on small wars as 
Hobbesian versus Schmittian interpretations (2003, 475f.): The Hobbesian inspiration 
characterizes small wars in terms of breakdown of authority and privatization of 
violence; the Schmittian frame emphasizes group loyalties, enmity and collective 
beliefs.14 Small wars, I have suggested, entail much more than belligerents and their 
opportunities as the opportunity, feasibility and predation framework suggests. 
Explaining the onset and dynamics of small wars and violent insurgency purely 
through the lens of opportunity, feasibility and predation, confining it to a rationalist 
conception of the properties of insurgents and belligerents clearly writes out the 
Schmittian dimension of the political pertinent in small wars. Insurgency is not only 
the continuation of economics with other means; it is not only about feasibility in a 
material or financial sense.  
I concur with Kalyvas who propagates a framework that combines the 
Hobbesian and the Schmittian interpretations. I have criticized the “geography of 
opportunity, feasibility and predation” literature for failing to address this “and”: the 
                                                 
13   While, at the moment, we still have only sketchy evidence, accounts and data on the link between 
affect and violence in small wars, there is some materials with a focus on affect and violence, but 
without explicit focus on small wars, that could stimulate this agenda: Valentine Daniel’s exploration 
on suffering and murmuring (Daniel 1996), writings on the “aesthetics” of violence, the addictive, 
suicidal drive into death that suicidal attackers may experience (Appadurai 2007, Enzensberger 2006, 
Sloterdijk 2006, Thrift 2007), although it appears to me that much of this work is based on shaky 
empirical data, if at all; finally, the important material compiled in Das et al. (2000) and in Scheper-
Hughes et al. (2003), though these two edited collections explore a much broader array of situations 
and contexts of violence, terror, coercion, including tribal warfare, ethnic riots, “state amok” and the 
holocaust.  
14   Kalyvas refers here to Carl Schmitt’s famous definition of the political as the friend-enemy 
distinction, as found in Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political ([1932] 1996). 
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entanglement of greed and grievance, of Hobbesian and Schmittian elements in small 
wars. Discussing “geography” in terms of terrain, location, concentration or 
commodity chains provides an account that (over-) emphasizes the greed dimension 
of small wars. It confines “geography” or “territory” to static conceptualizations, e.g. 
“locations” where violent events are recorded, resources are exploited or are traded. 
But beyond those patterns and phenomena, we find a lot else that is going on in small 
wars. Indeed, the “micro-foundations” are more complex than this type of literature 
has been willing to concede or to incorporate in their analytical framings. We find 
subaltern struggles for survival and subaltern opportunisms that link local livelihood 
struggles with war economies, greed with grievance. Small wars are about “rational 
madness” (Keen 1997) and the madness of rationality, affect and violence, everyday 
practices of resistance, complicity, coercion, consent, opportunism –all practices in 
the wake of “territorializing domination” (Mbembe 2001, 85).  
Sketching the elements of an alternative research agenda has brought us back 
to Carl Schmitt and his – admittedly romanticizing – telluric characterization of the 
partisan who is, according to Schmitt, more than a pirate, more than a corsair, more 
than a criminal. Watts’ analytics of governable spaces has pointed to the multiple 
mechanisms of territorialized rule and how identities and places are mobilized in 
political struggles during war by a multitude of actors (Ingram and Dodds 2009). It is 
the allusion to the “telluric” character of the partisan - telluric in the sense of relating 
to or inhabiting the land (as opposed to the sea or air) – and his (or her) struggle over 
meaning and belonging, which has informed the analytics of “geography of rule, 
violence and affect” – of the “telluric geographies” of small wars. The “telluric 
geographies” of small wars consist of the complex geography of actors, strategies, 
motivations and opportunities and of more than rational action and strategizing, all of 
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which are territorialized. The partisan, writes Schmitt, is connected with the terrain 
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